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Compensation for the nationalization of foreign investment has been
called "one of the most controversial areas of international law"' largely
because of the wide range of remedies that are employed by various legal
systems for breach of contract as well as for interference with property
rights. In awarding damages resulting from investment disputes between
private investors and foreign states, tribunals of the International Center for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) generally assess
compensation according to the estimated lost profits the injured investor
would have derived from the investment, which embodies the familiar
"expectation measure" of U.S. contract law. However, on occasion ICSID
tribunals have granted recovery for actual losses, meaning the costs of the
investment, or damnum emergens as they are known in some civil law
systems which follow the old Roman Law tradition, much as a domestic
court might award "reliance measure" damages. While the reasoning for
the tribunals' decisions to fix damages according to losses incurred as
opposed to (or sometimes in addition to)3 gains foregone is often unclear,
there is a sound economic rationale for a reliance-based standard of
compensation. Most importantly, the error costs of imperfect damages
based upon the level of actual investment should be lower than those
derived from other methods, and secondarily, confidentiality of sensitive
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IM. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 437 (2d ed. 2004).
2 See, e.g., Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R.136, 186
(1963).
3 Actual costs are typically argued in the alternative to lost profits by the claimant party.
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information is secured. Both of these advantages create incentives for
further foreign direct investment, which is one of the primary objectives of
the ICSID Convention and its dispute settlement system.
A. Topics for Discussion
This article will examine the types of situations and expenses which
ICSID tribunals have compensated by awarding damages for actual losses
suffered and will attempt to illustrate how this choice is generally
economically efficient. It will begin by outlining standards of damage
remedies that are commonly employed in international law and will
conclude with some criticisms of the reliance measure in the investment
context. As this article is forum-focused, it will not examine reliance-based
remedies in international investment law under other regimes, such as
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
arbitrations or under the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, in any detail.
Moreover, this article will not explore, other than incidentally, the highly
contentious issue of asset valuation methods used in international
investment arbitration,4 which are rightly viewed as secondary to the
finding of the compensation standard applicable to the dispute.5 Similarly,
the limitations of remoteness and foreseeability which feature in the
assessment of damages both in common law and international systems will
not be examined. An attempt to define the term investment directly is
beyond the scope of this article, although some examples of the types of
expenses that ICSID tribunals will recognize when granting recovery will
be seen. Finally, this article will not directly consider the controversial
issue of when state regulatory actions amount to an expropriation 6 for the
purposes of assessing compensation.
B. A Brief Introduction to ICSID
ICSID was established by the multilateral Convention on the
4 For a recent discussion of valuation methods in international investment law, see T.W.
Walde & Borzu Sabahi, Compensation, Damages and Valuation, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1049 (Peter Much Linski, Federico Ortino &
Christopher Schreuer eds., Oxford University Press 2008); C.N. Brower & M Ottolenghi,
Damages in Investor State Arbitration, 4:6 TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT. 1 (2007); Mark
Kantor, Valuation for Arbitration: Uses and Limits of Income-Based Valuation Methods, 4:6
TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT. 1 (2007); Irmgard Marboe, Compensation and Damages in
International Law: The Limits of "Fair Market Value", 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 723
(2006); Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
110 (2002).
5 SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 486.
6 For a recent discussion of this topic, see Justin R Marlles, Public Purpose, Private
Losses: Regulatory Expropriation and Environmental Regulation in International Investment
Law, 16 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 275 (2007).
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Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States which entered into force in 19667 and is part of the World Bank,
located in Washington, D.C., United States, although its proceedings may
take place elsewhere. Generally speaking, ICSID provides facilities for the
conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between contracting
states and nationals of other contracting states, although under its
Additional Facility Rules, states which are not party to the Convention may
now use ICSID tribunals for dispute settlement, as well as for certain other
fact-finding proceedings. 8 Independent arbitral tribunals are constituted for
each case under the procedural framework provided by the ICSID
Convention and using the center's facilities. Arbitration or conciliation
under ICSID is entirely voluntary, but once consent is given it cannot be
withdrawn unilaterally by either side. There are currently more than 150
countries which have ratified the convention and the caseload of the
tribunals has increased substantially in recent years largely due to the
proliferation of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). 9 In the past decade,
ICSID tribunals have resolved many disputes resulting notably from the
economic crisis in Argentina, as well as privatization initiatives associated
with the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. Typically, ICSID disputes
relate to troubles encountered by Western corporations which have invested
in large projects in the developing or lesser-developed countries due to
political upheavals in those countries.
Before embarking on the discussion of the key ICSID decisions, let it
be said that in establishing remedies in international investment arbitration,
the investment contract or BIT is of paramount importance. The first step
in the tribunal's assessment of an appropriate measure of damages, and
indeed its first step with respect to issues of jurisdiction and liability, is to
examine the text of the investment contract or relevant treaty itself. This is
because under the ICSID Convention, the tribunal is required to "decide a
dispute in accordance which such rules of law as may be agreed by the
parties." 10  Most of the now more than two thousand BITs require some
form of prompt compensation for expropriations or other breaches of
investment contracts, as do multilateral treaties such as the North
7 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID
Convention].
8 ICSID, Additional Facility Rules, Art. 2, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID
/StaticFiles/facility/AFREnglish-final.pdf.
9 See generally ICSID, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (last visited Mar. 19,
2008).
10 ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at Art. 42.
1 See, e.g., Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection Of
Investment (2004 Model BIT), Arts. 5.5, 6.2, available at http://www.ustr.gov
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), under which disputes are also
brought before ICSID. 12 It is also not uncommon for a concession contract
to leave open the nature of damages that will be available for breach, in
which case the fixing of damages is expressly granted to the ICSID tribunal
under the Convention. 13 In such cases, the tribunal will point to the law of
the host state or, more problematically as we shall see in the next section, to
the principles of international law. 14 Any of the above categories can lead
the tribunal to a consideration of monetary damages linked to the extent of
actual investment; however, the interplay of sources of authority for
principles of international law has rendered remedies in international
commercial arbitration highly uncertain, especially in the case of state
actions such as expropriation, 15 which is often the very type of dispute
brought before ICSID.
II. ASSESSING DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although it is conceded that there is no clear principle of
compensation for nationalization of property in international law,' 6 there is
almost universal consensus among international tribunals that the purpose
of damages for breach of contract is to place the injured party in the
position it would have been in had the contract been performed as
promised.17  International jurisprudence appears • to suggest that
compensation must repair, as far as possible by financial means, the damage
caused by the illegal act, and this may include both losses incurred as well
as gains foregone. Such a goal was famously pronounced by the Permanent
Court of Justice in the Chorzow Factory case when it wrote that reparation
must "wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the
situation that would, in all probability, have existed had that act not been
/assets/TradeSectors /Investment /Model_BIT/asset upload- file847 6897.pdf (calling for
"prompt compensation" based on the "fair market value of the investment" but offering no
insight as to compensation for lost profits or actual investments).
12 North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1110(2), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 612, at 641-42 (defining "compensation" as fair market value immediately before
expropriation). For further discussion of compensation for state interference with investors
under NAFTA, see Jeffrey Turk, Compensation for Measures "Tantamount to
Expropriation " Under NAFTA: What it Means and Why it Matters, 1 INT'L L. MGMT. REV.
41 (2005).
13 ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at Art. 42.
14 Id.
15 CHRISTINE D. GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 193-94 (1987).
16 SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 436. Sornarajah believes that the lack of uniformity is
due as much to different jurisdictions' views on property protection as their different
approaches to compensation. Id. at 452.
17 John Y. Gotanda, Recovering Lost Profits in International Disputes, 36 GEO. J. INT'L
L. 61, 99 (2004).
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committed."1 8 This principle of restitutio in integrum is mirrored in the
International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
which states that the state responsible for an internationally wrongful act "is
under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby" and such
compensation shall cover "any financially assessable damage including lost
profits in so far as it is established."' 9 With respect to breaches of contract
in particular, international commercial arbitration has similarly established
that the purpose of damages should be to "place the party to whom they are
awarded in the same pecuniary position that they would have been in had
the contract been performed.",
20
Civil law systems' terminology regarding damages are derived from
the Roman law principles of lucrum cessans (gains prevented) and damnum
emergens (actual loss suffered), and some combination of these two heads
of damages is typically applied in international fora to achieve the objective
restitutio in integrum. Lucrum cessans essentially mirrors the primary
objective of normal damages remedies in U.S. contract law, which is the
fulfillment of expectations that have been induced by the making of a
promise-the so-called "expectation measure." This is an amount of
money that would put the injured party in the position he or she would have
been in had the contract been properly performed, or which would give him
or her the benefit of the bargain.2  In the context of international
investment law, the expectation measure is properly viewed as the loss of
profits that would have been earned from the investment, but for the
interference of the host state. Lost future profits were awarded, for
example, in Sapphire v. N.I.O.C., noted above, despite the inherently
speculative nature of the investment concession.2 3 The second chief
category or head of damages for breach of contract in international law,
24damnum emergens, is conceptually similar to the reliance measure, which
compensates an injured party for any actions it undertook to its detriment in
anticipation of the other party's contractual performance, resulting in a loss
18 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Polish Republic), 1928 P.C.I.J.
(Ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13) [hereinafter Chorzow].
19 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex,
art. 36, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001).
20 See, e.g., Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136, 185-86
(1963).
2 1 Gotanda, supra note 17, at 65.
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR.,
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 117, at 769 (4th ed. 2001).
23 Sapphire, 35 I.L.R. at 187-88.
24 Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46
YALE L.J. 52, 55 (1936) (observing the similarity between reliance and damnum emergens
and noting that reliance damages may include foregone opportunities elsewhere, while
expectation damages may not).
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because of breach. Under this measure, damages may be recovered for an
amount representing the extent of the investments incurred for the purposes
of performance.25 In the context of international investment law, the
reliance measure is best seen in awards representing actual or direct
investment costs incurred by the investor. Terms such as "sunk costs,"
''wasted costs," or "out-of-pocket expenses" could also describe this remedy
with limited practical differences.
While both lucrum cessans and damnum emergens are often claimed
by the injured party, and often both awarded,26 damnum emergens is
typically awarded as an alternative when lost profits as per the expectation
or lucrum cessans approach cannot be measured with sufficient certainty.
Clearly parties whose investment activities have been adversely affected by
the actions or omissions of the states in which they invest may receive
compensation commensurate with their lost profits before an ICSID
tribunal. Moreover, such amounts need not be demonstrated with complete
certainty, and recovery will not be denied solely because the quantum is
difficult to determine. However, ICSID tribunals are reluctant to award
damages based on lost profits if such profits would be highly speculative
and would result in an amount grossly disproportionate to the sum that was
invested.28 In particular, ICSID tribunals hesitate to award damages for lost
profits to a new industry or one where there is limited record of profits.29
On the other hand, damnum emergens appears to be always recoverable.3 °
Although the assessment of damnum emergens has been praised by
Gray as straightforward 31 in a way that lost profits is not, evaluating the
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(b) (1981); MURRAY, supra note 22,
§ 117, at 769.
26 See infra Section V (noting that such awards are subject to denial of double-recovery).
27 See, e.g., Mar. Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, Award, ICSID
Case No. ARB/84/4, 4 ICSID (W. Bank) 54, 75 (1989). This is in keeping with modem U.S.
jurisprudence which typically permits recovery of lost profits, even for un-established
businesses, if the losses can be proved with reasonable certainty. See Gotanda, supra note
17, at 71.
28 See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 209, 232 (2000); Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 89, 125 (2000).
29 See, e.g., Asian Agric. Prod. Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, 4 ICSID (W. Bank) 245, 293 (1990); Metalclad, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) at 232.
Although it is now largely discredited, the "new business rule" of U.S. jurisprudence
encapsulated this problem of estimating future profits for unestablished businesses. See,
e.g., Cent. Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96, 98 (8th Cir. 1901). U.S. courts will
typically allow lost profit assessment if it can be proven with reasonable certainty. See
Gotanda, supra note 17, at 71-72.
30 See, e.g., Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/81/1, 1 ICSID (W. Bank) 377,498-506 (1984).
31 GRAY, supra note 15, at 201 (referring to the damages assessment in Sapphire Int'l
Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136 (1963), a non-ICSID arbitration).
200
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extent of actual investments in a particular project is not as orthodox as it
might initially appear. In the words of one ICSID tribunal, "it is a matter of
controversy whether to use funds invested as a measure of the value of the
investment., 32  This tension may rest upon the often unappreciated
difference between the value of the investment that has been seized by a
foreign state and the associated damages resulting therefrom, for example, a
lost future income stream. This key paradigm is itself founded upon the
important distinction between compensation resulting from a lawful
government expropriation and damages for an illegal act such as an
unlawful expropriation or a breach of contract.33  While the latter might
properly require assessment by reference to expectation losses, the former
may be within the sphere of reliance-based damages.34 However, the
ICSID tribunals that have awarded actual cost of investment do not appear
to acknowledge this distinction when deciding upon a standard for
assessing damages. Rather, the tribunals seem most concerned with
accuracy and the avoidance of speculation through credible verification of
amounts invested. Thus the primary objective in the remedy selection
process is one of precision, which may be explained according to an
underlying motive of efficiency, as shall be discussed in Section IV. Hojer
has suggested that ICSID tribunals may view actual investments as a
"starting point" 35 when assessing an appropriate remedy, but ultimately the
decision to implement a reliance-based remedy will depend upon the
contents of the particular investment contract or BIT, the circumstances of
each case, the type of investment, and importantly the nature of the
violation, such as whether it involves an expropriation or the violation of
the fair and equitable treatment standard that appears in most investment
agreements.
III. RELIANCE-BASED DAMAGES: RECOVERY FOR ACTUAL
INVESTMENTS AT ICSID
In some cases the tribunal has completely ignored a claimant's request
32 Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 2007 WL
1215068, 376 (2007).
33 GRAY, supra note 15, at 202 (noting that the significance of the distinction is not
entirely clear). Generally, the term "compensation" is used to remedy lawful takings and
"damages" is used when the taking was unlawful, although there is no practical difference
between the two concepts. Brower & Ottolenghi, supra note 4, at 4. Sornarajah also notes
that the seminal dicta from Chorzow was limited to unlawful takings, a fact that is not
appreciated by many legal scholars. SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 453-56.
34 SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 470 (referring to principles enunciated in Amoco Int'l
Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 493 (1982)).
35 Kaj Hober, 'Fair and Equitable Treatment'-Determining Compensation, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID):
TAKING STOCK AFTER 40 YEARS 79,101 (Rainer Hofmann & Christian J. Tams eds., 2007).
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for damages based upon out-of-pocket expenses incurred through their
activities, preferring instead to focus on the compensation of lost profits.36
The tribunal has also noted that compensation for investment costs should
be considered normal, stating: "previous arbitral tribunals.., have
overwhelmingly favored the award of lost investment costs," a reference to
the LIAMCO ad hoc oil concession arbitration which itself urged that
damnum emergens should be awarded in international investment disputes
as an absolute minimum, representing the value of tangible goods and the
cost of installations as well as unknown expenses. 3  In the very same
dispute, the ICSID tribunal commented that the determination of a lost
investment is a "relatively simple operation,, 38 unlike the calculation of lost
profits, a conclusion that is not obvious given the many assets that may
require consideration. However, this may depend on one's view of
simplicity-establishing the correct equation to denote future income could
be more burdensome.
In contrast to the enormous quantity of ICSID jurisprudence regarding
the valuation of lost profits for the purposes of damages awards, there is
startling little ICSID case law concerning investment-based compensation.
Review of this limited material reveals that the determination of lost
investments at ICSID is essentially an accounting exercise, the principal
difficulty of which is establishing the veracity of the evidence presented
regarding expenditures.
Actual investment expenses were recovered by the claimant in Wena
Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt39 as an alternative to an award for
lost profits to compensate for the expropriation of hotels in Cairo and
Luxor. Lost profits were unrecoverable both because there was an
insufficient record of profits before the seizure on which to base an estimate
and because the amount claimed (E46) was grossly disproportionate to the
amount invested (E9). In fixing damages based instead on the claimant's
actual investments in the hotel projects, the tribunal added that the fact that
expenses were incurred by the claimant's affiliates was immaterial,
although adjustments were made to account for erroneous double counting
of certain unidentified expenses. This determination survived an
evidentiary challenge at a later annulment proceeding-the respondent's
allegation that various financial documents were missing was rejected, the
36 See, e.g., Mar. Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, Award, ICSID
Case No. ARB/84/4, 4 ICSID (W. Bank) 61 (1997) (where lost profits could be ascertained
readily based on past performance).
37 Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Republic of Liberia, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/83/2, 2
ICSID (W. Bank) 346, 371 (1994) (citing Libyan American Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 20 I.L.M. 1 (1981)).
38 Id. at 372.
39 Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, 6
ICSID (W. Bank) 89 (2000).
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tribunal noting that it may assess the credibility and completeness of
evidence at its own discretion.40 This case underlines the importance of
reliable evidence in the establishment of a cost-incurred remedy.
A reliance-based measure of damages was contemplated by ICSID in
its high-profile arbitration of a NAFTA dispute between Metalclad, the
subsidiary of a Mexican corporation, and the United States regarding the
latter's interference with a landfill development project through both unfair
treatment and expropriation. 4' As an alternative to the fair market value of
the assessment, the claimant corporation proposed the actual investment in
the landfill as an appropriate means of fixing compensation. The tribunal
viewed actual investments as the correct mechanism for ascertaining
compensation because a claim of market value based on future profits could
not be adequately substantiated by reference to past performance, given the
insufficient record of the landfill's prior commercial activity. In arriving at
this decision, the tribunal cited similar practice by the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal, which had used a value of investment method to gauge
compensation in the absence of a realistic estimate of future profits.42 The
actual investment method was also seen as being consistent with the
celebrated guidelines from the International Court of Justice in Chorzow,
which, as noted in Section II, established that compensation should "wipe
out the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which
would in all probability have existed if that act had not been committed.
4 3
Metalclad used U.S. federal income tax documentation and an independent
auditor's reports to substantiate its investment costs, which included such
items as personnel, insurance, travel, telephone, accounting and legal,
consulting, office, property, and plant and equipment costs. The tribunal
adopted a more stringent approach to preparatory costs, denying recovery
for costs incurred in the year prior to Metalclad's purchase of the company
which owned the landfill because such costs were seen as too remote to the
investment. This aspect of the ruling illustrates that limiting principles of
damages familiar to common law jurisdictions are relevant to the
establishment of remedies by ICSID tribunals.
The ICSID tribunal elected to assess damages based on the reliance
measure in the recent case PSEG Global Inc. (Claimant), Konya 11gin
Elektrik Oretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Claimant) v. Turkey
40 Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Annulment Proceeding, ICSID Case No.
ARB/98/4, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 129, 143-44 (2002).
41 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1,
120, 5 ICSID Reports 209, 232 (2000).
42 Phelps Dodge Int'l Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 121
(Mar. 19, 1986).
43 Chorzow, supra note 18, at 47.
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(Respondent)." As an alternative to a claim for lost profits, claimants
PSEG Global Inc. and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Uretim ve Ticaret Limited
Sirketi argued that they deserved compensation in the amount of the
investment by the Turkish government for its legislative interference with
the companies' operations of the newly privatized energy sector in Turkey's
central region. The particular out-of-pocket expenses cited included costs
of preparing the power plant project as well as mine studies, contract
negotiations and financing, environmental costs, permits and license fees,
and legal and consulting fees. The respondent Turkey contended that more
than half of the claimed costs were incurred by other companies actually
unrelated to the energy project and consequently should not be
compensated. More importantly, Turkey argued that investment costs
should not be awarded because the project would have ultimately led to a
loss, a restriction on the application of the reliance remedy seen in U.S.
contract law, 45 and one that has not been universally applied, as will be
shown below. In expanding upon the precise expenses for which
compensation could be paid, the tribunal stated:
An investment can take many forms before actually reaching the
construction stage, including most notably the cost of negotiations
and other preparatory work ... even in connection with pre-
investment expenditures, particularly when.., there is a valid and
binding Contract duly executed between the parties.46
The tribunal awarded investment-based damages of approximately
nine million dollars, although only those expenses actually incurred by the
claimants themselves, not those by related companies, were included, and
the award was diminished slightly because of erroneous double-counting
for certain smaller expenses. The cost of contract negotiation itself and
legal fees therein, meaning some expenses incurred even before the
existence of any legal obligation, were also viewed as legitimate expenses
deserving of compensation.47 Previous ICSID case law, notably Metalclad,
has suggested that preparatory expenses prior to the execution of the
investment contract will not be recoverable, even if they could be
44 PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5,
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docld=DC630_En&caseld=C212 (Jan. 19, 2007) [hereinafter PSEG].
45 MURRAY, supra note 22, at § 121 D (citing Bausch & Lomb v. Bressler, 977 F.2d 720
(2d Cir. 1992). The logic behind this rule is that damages should not be awarded that will
allow parties to escape the risk of bad bargains.).
46 PSEG, supra note 44, 304.
47 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (1981) (indicating that recovery for
detrimental reliance incurred before contract formation was controversially permitted by the
British Court of Appeal in Anglia TV v. Reed, 3 All E.R. 690 (1971) and is now
acknowledged under U.S. contract law).
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considered part of the investment.48  Whether or not such costs are
recoverable may, of course, depend on the wording of the particular
investment agreement. It is noteworthy that legal fees incurred in
establishing an investment (rather than disputing losses from an affected
investment) have been explicitly labeled "out-of-pocket" costs by another
ICSID tribunal and compensated accordingly.49 The tribunal's decision to
award the investment costs in PSEG appeared to be based primarily on the
fact that the amounts claimed had been subjected to a careful and credible
audit. That the electricity project may have ultimately led to a loss had it
been completed was influential in preventing the tribunal from awarding
lost profits, which it viewed as highly speculative, but a prospective loss on
the contract did not appear to undermine the compensation for out-of-
pocket costs, as it might well have in domestic U.S. law had the loss been
sufficiently established by the respondent. 
Another ICSID tribunal considered the extent of recovery for
investment-related expenses in Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A.
(Claimant) v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Respondent),51 a dispute
brought by a Venezuelan company against the Venezuelan government
regarding a concession to build and improve a highway system connecting
the city of Caracas to the coast, which was hindered by the government's
decision to freeze highway toll rates due to a citizen uprising. Venezuela
argued that under the terms of the concession agreement, the respondent
company could only claim out of pocket expenses incurred through
activities that fulfilled the terms of the agreement. Although the tribunal
allowed the respondent to claim for lost profits as well, pointing to a more
broadly phrased provision of the agreement allowing other heads of
damages, the tribunal did state that with respect to the investment costs,
only those out-of-pocket costs sustained under the terms of the contract
could be compensated. In order to ascertain which particular investment
costs could be claimed, the tribunal examined financial statements prepared
by the respondent company, which it viewed as presumptively reliable,
noting however that an unexplained increase in recorded costs would not be
recoverable. Applying Venezuelan law, recovery of bidding costs was not
permissible (although they were not in fact claimed), but negotiation costs
were. A loan extended by the claimant to an affiliate company was not
48 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, 2005
WL 578418 217, 240(ii) (May 25, 2004) (upheld following Annulment Proceeding ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/7 and holding that the preparatory work was not compensable under the
law of Chile).
49 Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Republic of Liberia, Decision on Rectification, ICSID
Case No. ARB/83/2, 2 ICSID (W. Bank) 343, 381 (1986).
5o MURRAY, supra note 22, at § 121 D.
51 Autopistsa Concesionada de Venez., C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 419 (2003).
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viewed as a legitimate out-of-pocket expense because it could not be
substantiated through the claimant's expert's unreliable testimony. The
tribunal ruled that although legal costs arising out of the highway project
(apart from the ICSID arbitration itself) were the valid subject of a claim,
only those costs incurred as a result of the respondent's action could be
recovered-not those involving litigation with private citizens who had
disrupted the highway project. As the claimant did not properly segregate
these two categories of legal cost in its financial records, the tribunal
awarded half of the claimant's legal costs (an amount representing what the
tribunal saw as the expenses relating to dealings with the Venezuelan
government). Costs of soil studies prepared by the claimant company in
anticipation of the project were awarded, despite the fact that they were
incomplete and had no current value to either party. Administrative costs
incurred regarding the ongoing operation of the highway project during the
disruptions were recoverable, although the tribunal discounted the
claimant's specified amount by ten percent to reflect the tribunal's
impression that the amount was excessive given the incompleteness of the
expert's report on this matter. The total amount of out-of-pocket expenses
awarded to the claimant company was just over two billion BS. 52
Additional amounts were recovered for lost profits which were specifically
allowed under the concession agreement, irrespective of any concurrent
recovery for expenses.
Out-of-pocket expenses were examined by the tribunal in Southern
Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt53 for a
claim involving a Hong Kong company's investments in tourist facilities
near the Giza Pyramids and on the Mediterranean coast of Egypt, which
were later opposed by citizens because of concerns of damage to ancient
sites and artifacts, and resulted in the public expropriation of the designated
land. As an alternative to damages based upon the value of the investment
project at the time of expropriation, the claimants requested compensation
for out-of-pocket expenses, including a loan to an affiliated company,
capital and development costs, and pre- and post-project cancellation
administrative and legal costs. The tribunal outlined the nature of these
expenses:
[C]onsiderable amounts of time and money were spent on
negotiating, planning and implementing the project. [The Claimant]
made capital contributions and loans [to its affiliate] ... these
amounts must be reimbursed as part of ... fair compensation...
[W]hen the project was cancelled, construction was under way and
considerable marketing activity had been carried out. Most of the
52 Bolivars, the Venezuelan currency.
53 S. Pac. Prop. Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, 3
ICSID (W. Bank) 189 (1992).
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detailed engineering design and specifications for the first phase ...
had been completed. A construction contract had been concluded for
the infrastructure, construction had begun and lot sales had
commenced. To the extent that the expenses associated with this
activity have been proven.., reimbursement of such expenses is
also part of... fair compensation.
54
Recoverable development costs were further elaborated to include
allocation of salaries, travel and entertainment expenses of executives,
recruitment and' relocation of personnel, as well as consultations for
marketing and banking. Again, the recovery of these amounts was
contingent upon the production of documentation detailing the specific
nature, date, and amount of expense incurred in order to confirm that they
were legitimately related and directly connected to the project. Such
expenses were viewed by the tribunal as irrecoverable losses because of the
cancellation of the tourist development project. It is significant that the
tribunal denied recovery for any investment expenses that could not be
verified through proper documentation, including those where the
individual payee could not be identified. The tribunal also oddly included
litigation costs associated with its own procedure as legitimate "out-of-
pocket" expenses that should be compensated in order to make whole the
party who had suffered the loss.55 This does not appear to fit with the U.S.
concept of detrimental reliance since litigation costs are not incurred for the
purpose of performing the contractual obligation.
The Southern Pacific tribunal also interestingly distinguished between
ordinary out-of-pocket expenses and those involving the costs of lost
opportunity in making a commercial success of the project, illustrating that
the parity between the concepts of damnum emergens and reliance is not
absolute.5 6  Most significantly, the tribunal noted that the appropriate
situation in which reliance-based damages should be awarded is when the
value of the investment at the time of expropriation is either nil or less than
the out-of-pocket expenses.5 7 As discussed earlier, this is the exact opposite
of U.S. common law which denies reliance-based recovery where there
would have been a loss in performance. 58 The tribunal's logic is unclear
here as damages should not be awarded in an amount that enables parties to
avoid the natural risk of bad bargains. In Southern Pacific the investment
value at the time of expropriation of the project was determined to be more
than the previously calculated out-of-pocket expenses. The tribunal
54 Id., 384.
" Id., 386.
56 See Fuller & Purdue, supra note 24 (indicating that reliance would typically not award
opportunity costs).
57 S. Pac. Prop., 3 ICSID (W. Bank), 388.
58 MURRAY, supra note 22, at § 121.D.
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consequently awarded the difference between the value of the project at
expropriation and the investment costs in addition to the previously
calculated out-of-pocket expenses (approximately three million dollars).59
In the resubmitted Amco Asia v. Indonesia60 case regarding the
nationalization of a hotel apartment complex, the ICSID tribunal criticized
the asserted method of Net Book Value of invested assets as a means of
ascertaining the extent of expenditures, noting that this method had
typically been used in international law where compensation for prospective
earnings was unavailable for some reason, such as a legislative bar to profit-
based recovery in the law of the host state.61 While a full treatment of asset
valuation methodology is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted
that it is unfortunate that no precise definition of the concept of Net Book
Value was given by the tribunal here, other than the somewhat unhelpful
"assets minus liability. ' 62  Further elaboration would have been
illuminating because of the important role that depreciation necessarily
plays in the valuation of reliance-based expenditures. One would expect
that capital assets purchased for the purpose of an investment which is
subsequently expropriated should not be assessed at their initial cost but
rather diminished according to the decline in the assets' value over their
use, i.e. during the profit-earning period prior to the termination of the
investment due to expropriation, otherwise over-compensation will result.
Without addressing this important issue directly, the tribunal concluded that
the Net Book Value methodology was inappropriate with respect to certain
types of assets, such as long-term contractual rights, ultimately preferring to
focus on projected future profits as the measure of damages, which it
ascertained using Discounted Cash Flow analysis.6 3 Interestingly, the
59 S. Pac. Prop., 3 ICSID (W. Bank), T 389 (noting the tribunal adjusted upwards the
investment expenses awarded because of the devaluation of the US dollar that had occurred
since the project had begun in 1978).
60 Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, Resubmitted Case: Award, ICSID Case
No. ARB/81/1, 1 ICSID (W. Bank) 569 (1990).
61 Id. at 615-16 (noting the tribunal listed numerous other situations in which Book
Value of assets had been used, including, strangely, "where the claimant himself had
requested as damages the reimbursement of his invested capital" which would seem to be a
very common occurrence).
62 Id. at 615 (noting another ICSID tribunal explained that Book Value is an appropriate
means of valuing a recent investment where there is no market for the assets that have been
expropriated; however it is often also used to value costs actually incurred which were
wasted in the effort to generate revenue. See Siemens A.G. v. Arg. Republic, 2007 WL
1215068, T 355.).
63 Id. at 620-22 (stating that depreciation issues were relevant for the purposes of
assessing future profits as well). Another ICSID tribunal has noted that discounted cash
flow is itself a highly speculative measure and should be used with caution. See ADC
Affiliate v. Republic of Hungary, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc
&docld=DC648_En&caseld=C231, 502 (Oct. 2, 2006).
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original tribunal had noted that the value of physical assets would also
inform the result of a future profit analysis; however the approach is not
always appropriate:
[T]he value of the physical assets lost by the investor due to the
taking of the investment is added to the discounted cash flow in
order to assess the total amount of the damages ... [but] this method
might raise serious problems in cases where at the end of the
contractual relationship (or of the legal relationship comparable to a
contractual one), the injured party would not have been entitled to
keep valuable goods previously utilized for the operation of the
business. Moreover, the value of physical assets thus utilized is itself
essentially based on the earnings that such utilization may yield;
therefore, the valuation of the net cash flow may well reflect the
commercial value of the physical assets.
64
The conclusion here appears to be that a future profit analysis may
paradoxically be the best way to assess a past-investment based loss. This
is seen in the concepts of Net Present Cash Flow, which attempts to fix a
current value of the investment according to the projected value of lost
future business. Indeed the complexities of the various accounting
measures lead one to question the rigidity of the boundaries between the
simple categories of reliance and expectation-based damages, which may
well be the reason that both lucrum cessans and damnum emergens are
typically argued by the claimants in ICSID arbitrations.
In Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, claimant Azurix asserted that
the extent of its compensation for the expropriation of its water concession
by Argentina should be based on the actual investment method, and the
tribunal felt that this method was appropriate because the investment in
question "is recent and highly ascertainable. 65  This case is worthy of
recognition because the tribunal was concerned that the "aggressive" price
paid for the concession by the claimant was excessive compared to other
bids. The tribunal held that in fact no well informed investor would have
paid such a high amount based on the modest estimated revenues of the
project. Consequently, gauging damages according to amounts invested is
not always a sensible approach because such amounts may be commercially
unreasonable in the circumstances. In awarding compensation for
investment costs based on an amount that an independent well-informed
third party would have paid for the concession, which was substantially less
64 Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, 1
ICSID (W. Bank) 413, 501-502 (1984).
65 Azurix Corp. v. Arg. Republic, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/1, available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc
&docld=DC507_En&caseld=C5, 425 (July 14, 2006).
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than what the claimant actually paid, the tribunal appeared to be merely
reiterating a familiar aspect of the reliance remedy: damages will be
recovered for the costs of performance reasonably incurred.
Although the text of the ICSID awards is not always clear on the point,
it must be emphasized that while the tribunal permits recovery for both lost
investments and lost profits, it does not permit double recovery (costs and
profit) for the same items, which would result in costless gain for
investments and which would be invidious even for the lowest risk
commercial activities. In order to avoid double recovery, the amount
awarded for lost profits must be reduced by the investment amount such
that compensation for lost profits is always net.66
The adjustment of investment-based compensation because of an
award for future profits was seen in Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation
v. Republic of Liberia,67 a dispute involving a concession agreement for the
harvesting of forest products. Here the tribunal explicitly reduced the
recovery for investment in infrastructure, machinery, and equipment
because that amount had already been included in the calculation of net
profit: i.e. the figure for expected profit was derived from gross income
expected minus costs incurred. The only investment cost that was not
reduced in this way was a bank penalty on a loan, taken out for the purposes
of the investment, that was imposed because of Liberia's interference with
the project. Although the concept of "profit" necessarily means net rather
than total gain, this is not always apparent when ICSID awards include both
lost future income and out of pocket expenses. It is often necessary to
review the tabulated amounts at the end of the award rather than the text of
the judgment in order for this understanding to emerge.
IV. EFFICIENCY GOALS OF ICSID AWARDS
The cases discussed above divulge very little by way of ratio
decidendi with respect to the selection of cost-based damages other than the
traditional concern for achieving accuracy, primarily by avoiding the
prediction of uncertain future profits based on unverifiable evidence. That
there is little economic analysis of investment law 68 and certainly none that
has focused on ICSID is somewhat surprising because although the ICSID
tribunals do not attempt to justify their decisions on efficiency grounds, the
66 See Kantor, supra note 4, 69-71.
67 Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Republic of Liberia, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/83/2, 2
ICSID (W. Bank) 346 (1986).
68 Exceptions include Fabrizio Marrella & Irmgard Marboe, 'Efficient Breach' and
Economic Analysis of International Investment Law, 4:6 TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT. 1 (2008);
Alan 0. Sykes, Public v. Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and
Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STuD. 631 (2005) (advocating private claims for monetary damages in
international investment law but not in international trade).
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selection of remedies in this manner is grounded in economic theory. Put
simply, compensation based upon amounts actually invested is chosen by
ICSID tribunals because such awards serve the obvious function of
reducing error costs.
Courts and tribunals suffer from a deficiency in information regarding
laws or facts which results in mistakes when applying substantive legal
principles. One of the most common mistakes on the part of adjudicatory
bodies is their failure to assess the quantum of damages accurately such that
a breach of contract (or a tortious injury) is not properly compensated.
With perfect information available, a court will be able to craft a perfect
remedy (which is often seen as the level at which the injured party would be
indifferent between performance and breach or injury and cash), 69 but as
this is a logical impossibility, courts must seek a second-best alternative,
which is to apply as much information (facts and law) as possible without
the process cost of evaluating this information exceeding the advantage of
accuracy in pronouncing the correct judgment. Thus, in their attempt to
minimize error costs (the inevitable failure to select a perfectly accurate
judgment), courts are compelled to craft remedies based on the most
reliable available information.
70
In each of the ICSID cases discussed above there was a large quantity
of cost-oriented information readily available to the tribunal in the form of
expert testimony or financial records which was readily applied to tailor a
remedy that approximated perfection. Were a profit-focused or expectation
type standard pursued, this information would have had less utility (or even
none) but more importantly the risk of adjudicative errors would have risen
because of the consequential resort to predictive modeling as a basis for
judgment. However, the provision and examination of extensive cost-based
evidence also represents a process cost to the disputants, and one that could
ultimately result in resistance against the use of ICSID as a means of
adjudicating disputes because of higher litigation fees. In contrast, the
tribunal's determination of future profits appears to involve essentially the
application of one or more formulae to historical revenue data, an exercise
which appears to entail a much diminished (and less costly) evidentiary
consideration than the assessment of numerous individual assets.
71
There are also social costs that result from the imposition of an
imperfect remedy that the tribunals have attempted to avoid through
reliance-based damages. These are the distortions in incentives that are
69 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMics 303 (3d ed. 2000).
70 Id. at 376.
71 These process cost differentials are the general impression of this author based purely
on a reading of the cases discussed herein (notably Autopista and Azurix) and cannot be
verified because litigation costs as disclosed are not segregated according to their
mathematical and or evidentiary components.
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implicated from either over-compensation or under-compensation of an
injury resulting from an expropriation or broken investment agreement. 72 If
the injured investor is compensated below the level of perfection, then other
investors will be reluctant to engage in foreign direct investment in the
future-which is one of the purposes of the ICSID Convention.73 Merrill
has suggested, however, that the failure to compensate an investor fully
may result in positive incentives: foreign firms may be discouraged from
engaging in investments that are harmful to a foreign state in case such
actions result in a regulatory response from that state.74 If an injured
investor is over-compensated, this might be viewed as an interference with
a state's sovereign right to nationalize its own industry in the interest of its
people. An excessive damages award will then undermine the political
legitimacy of future investment arbitration.75 Moral hazard may also ensue,
as investors will allocate the risk of their investments to the respondent state
during dispute settlement. 76 Over-compensating investors may give them
the perverse incentive to act irresponsibly, 77 for example, by engaging in
activities which although profitable, are damaging to the local environment.
Furthermore, with excessive damages, host states will be discouraged from
terminating economically wasteful projects where to do so would be
efficient, a so-called "efficient breach.,, 78 The important point here is that
in order for a state to engage in a rational assessment of efficient remedies it
will need to be able to calculate ex ante the costs of breach and compare
them to the cost of compliance. 79  The readily discernable (or at least
estimable) nature of actual investment costs (as opposed to estimated future
profits) thus represents an attractive remedy from an incentive perspective
because the determinations should be expected to approximate reality in
most situations. Such incentive effects are particularly acute even for a
private tribunal like ICSID as most of its cases are now disseminated on the
internet and in case reporters and many disputes now receive extensive
media coverage.
Although again not directly referenced in any ICSID cases, reliance-
based damages may be preferable from an efficiency perspective because
72 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 69, at 377.
73 Uncompensated losses associated with government takings have been termed
"demoralization costs." Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation'Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1224 (1967).
74 Merrill, supra note 4, at 135.
75 Walde & Sabahi, supra note 4, at 4.
76 Id. at 12.
77 Turk, supra note 12, at 70.
78 Marrella & Marboe, supra note 68, at 8.
79 Id. at 13 (noting that the costs to the state may not be simply the payment of damages -
there will be reputational costs that could result in difficulty attracting foreign investment in
the future).
Reliance Remedies at the ICSID
29:195 (2009)
the proof of expectation damages based upon projected profits may require
the innocent party to divulge potentially sensitive information about their
own internal business strategy, 80 unlike investment-related information
such as labor and equipment costs. Expected profits could amount to
"showing one's hand" in a way that could advantage competitors, whereas
the pricing of supplies might be publicly available information. Obviating
the need to disclose profit information would assuage some of the
confidentiality concerns that have cultivated ICSID members' reluctance to
publish all awards in their entirety and in so doing lessen the widespread
disdain for the forum from the international community because of its lack
of transparency. Increased transparency of ICSID awards is of vital
importance with respect to the integrity of the arbitral process, to the
confidence of its users in the system and-most importantly from an
economic standpoint-the effectiveness of ICSID in encouraging foreign
81investment. Since both confidentiality and transparency of the
proceedings are highly desirable features of international commercial
arbitration, remedies that facilitate both objectives should be pursued.
Whereas information regarding lost profits might expose investors to
unwanted scrutiny from competitors, actual expenditures would do little
more than demonstrate the business acumen associated with a past project.
V. SUITABILITY OF RELIANCE-BASED REMEDIES
The appropriateness of reliance-based compensation may depend on
whether the injurious behavior was the result of an expropriation, or was for
violations of the fair and equitable treatment standard, as the former
terminates an investment whereas the latter may still permit ongoing
business activity.82 In the case of an expropriation, an award of lost profits
may be more apt because the likely higher quantum will represent the most
investor-friendly approximation of the injuries sustained and an award of
something less than anticipated missed profits from the seized investment
will represent incomplete compensation. If the investment activity
continues, however, with some unfair treatment from the host state falling
short of expropriation, then an award of profits could well represent a
double-recovery given that some profit may be maintained. The difficulty
in fixing compensation for breaches of the fair and equitable treatment
standard is exacerbated by the lack of reference to compensation for such
injuries in treaty language (in contrast to expropriation), and consequently
80 RICHARD EPsTEIN, TORTS § 21.3 (1999).
81 See, e.g., Noah Rubins, Opening the Investment Arbitration Process: At What Cost, for
What Benefit?, in THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
DISPuTES (ICSID): TAKING STOCK AFTER 40 YEARS 213, 215-17 (Rainer Hofmann &
Christian J. Tams eds., 2007).
82 Hober, supra note 35, at 83.
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compensation for such violations will often depend on the circumstances of
each dispute. 83
Some commentators have criticized the application of contract law's
somewhat rigid categorization of heads of damage to the arena of
international investment in part because of this concern for double-recovery
engendered by the application of both damnum emergens and lucrum
cessans to activities that comprise both individualized assets and future
income streams.84 However, as suggested above, double recovery should
be prevented by the application of a net rather than gross profit
determination, which one might expect would amount to lucrum cessans
minus damnum emergens rather than in addition to it, although of course
any formula including both heads would require twice the resources in
calculation (double process costs) as well as a corresponding increase in
error potential. Clearly, the circumstances of each case will dictate the
optimal remedial approach, which will take into account the risks of under-
and over-compensation as noted above.
Assessing damages in investment arbitration on the basis of the
amount of investment has been recommended by Wells because this
measure is likely to approximate full market value, at least in the case of
recently acquired assets.85 It is significant that none of.the ICSID cases
discussed herein appeared to consider recovery for the actual investment
costs of intangibles such as business goodwill, customer loyalty, or
reputation. The use of the damnum emergens measure in the investment
context has been condemned for its inability to address such losses, as well
as for failing to account for incremental increases in value for development
activities in an unfinished project beyond their initial acquisition cost. 86
However, this objection represents more a criticism of individual asset
valuation methodology rather than the standard of compensation, an often
blurred distinction that must be kept in mind during the remedy stage of an
award. Once the various expenses for which damages will be paid have
been identified via a standard of compensation, the evaluation process
operates as a separate and very complex aspect of ICSID adjudication.
Commentators have observed that arriving at a precise valuation of
damages in investment disputes is a much more difficult task than merely
83 loana Tudor, Balancing the Breach of the FET Standard, 4:6 TRANSNAT'L DisP.
MGMT. (2007); Peter Mulchinski, Caveat Investor? The Relevance of the Conduct of the
Investor Under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 527
(2006).
84 See, e.g., Marboe, supra note 4, at 727-28; Walde & Sabahi, supra note 4, at 1.
85 Louis T. Wells, Double Dipping in Arbitration Awards? An Economist Questions
Damages Awarded to Karaha Bodas Company in Indonesia, 19 ARB. INT'L 471, 474-75
(2003).
86 Kantor, supra note 4, at 10, 22-23.
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establishing the standard to be applied.87 Although not properly the subject
of this article, there has been some indication in the application of the
reliance measure that a wide range of valuation methods are used by ICSID.
Indeed a flexible interplay of many methods has been advocated by
88commentators. In quantifying the precise value of an investment (via
whatever standard of damage), the tribunal has stated that its methodology
89
and reasoning should be fully transparent. Unfortunately, the preceding
examination has shown that there is very little explanation offered by
ICSID tribunals as to the precise methodology of evaluation of actual
investment-based compensation. This general shortcoming of international
arbitration has been acknowledged by commentators 90 and remains a
legitimate grievance of disputants at ICSID as well as those in the academic
community.
It is difficult to discern any instructive jurisprudence from ICSID cases
regarding awards of actual investment costs, other than the indisputable
assertion that they are more likely to be implemented when future profits
are highly indeterminate. In addition to the stipulation of actual investment
recovery in an investment contract or BIT, it can also be concluded that
detailed, verifiable financial statements are essential to the success of a
claim for actual investment losses. ICSID awards are manifestly fact-
oriented and it would not be far wrong to characterize ICSID tribunals as
fact-finding bodies. This statement is intended to be descriptive rather than
judgmental. The extent to which the tribunal focuses on the evidence
tendered by the parties for the purposes of assessing damages for
nationalization claims should be familiar to U.S. observers, as the process
of adducing financial evidence for the purposes of valuation, often with the
aid of expert testimony, has been compared to that of domestic U.S. takings
litigation under the U.S. Constitution.91 One must also recall that under the
ICSID Convention, the tribunals are empowered with total discretion in
deciding on the relevance and admissibility of evidence adduced by the
parties, as well as in exercising the power to request further information.
92
87 Brower & Ottolenghi, supra note 4, at 13-14.
88 Walde & Sahadi, supra note 4, at 22 (suggesting that complexity of valuation methods
may require the use of the tribunal's own expert).
89 Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, 1
ICSID (W. Bank) 377,466-67 (1984).
90 See, e.g., Brower & Ottolenghi, supra note 4, at 1.
91 Merrill, supra note 4, at 115-17..
92 CHRISTOPHER SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 647 (2001). See
also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States art. 43, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
(entered into force Oct. 14, 1966); The ICSID Arbitration Rules, rule 34(1) (2003) ("The
Tribunal shall be the judge of the admissibility of any evidence adduced and of its probative
value.").
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This is the type of adjudication to which contracting members assent by
virtue of their ratification of the Convention.
The attempt to subject the assessment of damages in international
arbitration to general rules of law has been opposed in favor of a more
pragmatic approach based on, inter alia, the relationship between the
parties. 93 Such remedial flexibility is particularly important in disputes that
are essentially fact-based. 94  While remedial flexibility is a worthwhile
objective, the process must have determinacy, which is perhaps the most
appealing feature of reliance-based measures even if full compensation is
ultimately compromised. Complete compensation may not always be the
most desirable goal. Indeed international investment law has shown a trend
towards partial compensation for many types of takings by foreign states,
such as those which are lawful or those where the investor had adopted bad
industry practices. 95
VI. CONCLUSION
Gray has termed the quest for a single method of calculating
compensation for breach of international contracts "a chimera that has been
obsessively pursued by many scholars," 96 and this article has by no means
attempted to suggest that it has found the answer in relation to international
investment arbitration. Rather than abandon the common law of contract's
preference for lost profit-based compensation, this article has demonstrated
that ICSID's occasional recourse to actual investment losses is a suitable
complement to expectation-oriented damages in some circumstances, and
one that is, perhaps unknowingly, based upon principles of efficiency. In
addition to reducing error costs of faulty compensation because of
evidentiary reliability, and the associated incentives engendered therein,
reliance-based awards at ICSID will also serve to enhance confidentiality of
dispute settlement without impeding transparency. ICSID's use of
damnum emergens may reflect its willingness to escalate the process costs
of adjudication through voluminous but verifiable evidence rather than risk
raising the error costs of faulty judgments based on uncertain expectations.
Given the incentives that should ensue from the application of this "safer"
measure, the observed application of reliance-based damages at ICSID can
be applauded and other international fora should be urged to follow suit.
93 GRAY, supra note 15, at 206.
94 Peter Ashford, Documentary Discovery and International Commercial Arbitration, 17
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 89, 96 (2006).
95 SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 485.
96 GRAY, supra note 15, at 202.
